"Death by sashimi": the survival of the Southern Bluefin Tuna
Richard
Tanter, Arena Journal, New Series, 14,
(1999/2000).
A Japanese version of this article appeared as "
Sashimi no Kei (1)", Kankyo Zatsugaku Magajin,
25.12.99.
In the late 1980s Greenpeace International campaigned effectively against the Japanese government's unilateral "scientific whaling research programme" with a famous joke in a newspaper advertisement. Above a photograph of a large Japanese whaling ship on a lovely blue ocean, the text read:
Question: How do you define a Japanese fishing
researcher?
Answer: Hungry!
For many people outside Japan, the joke expressed the Japanese government's deceptive intentions in its unilateral whaling research programme. What kind of "research" was it, people wondered, where thousands of the animals killed for science ended up on the tables of Japanese restaurants? One result of that research programme was serious damage to the reputation of Japanese marine research for impartiality and objectivity.
That aroma of suspicion is drifting back today, this time not about whales, but about that expensive Japanese delicacy, Southern Bluefin Tuna [SBT]. Is it possible that the Japanese greed for SBT sashimi will open the possibility of a death sentence for an entire species?
In August 1999, the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea ordered Japan to suspend its unilateral Experimental Fishing Programme [EFP] for SBT, and to re-enter negotiations with Australia and New Zealand, the two countries which had brought the case against Japan to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea [ITLOS]. The three countries, which are the members of the Commsission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna [CCSBT], have been locked in a three year disagreement concerning the size of the stocks of SBT. Unable to secure agreement to its proposed joint research programme from Australia and New Zealand within the CCSBT, in mid-1998 Japan launched a unilateral SBT Experimental Fishing Programme, with Japanese fishing boats taking 1440 t. of SBT for scientific purposes, on top of the 5588 t. which is Japan's annual quota under the CCSBT. Unfortunately for Japan's international scientific image, not only as the research been criticized as scientifically inadequate, but once again the scientific research materials have been sold in Tokyo's world-famous Tsukuji fish market.
Southern bluefin tuna (Thunnus maccoyii) are wonderful looking fish that flash through the cold waters of the Southern Ocean above Antarctica, up to the extreme southern coast of Australia, Africa and South America. Mature SBT can be over two metres in length, and weigh up to 200 kg. They are long lived fish, maturing at about 8 - 12 years, and often living more than 40 years. Highly migratory, they breed from September to March in the warm waters between Java and northwestern Australia, before returning to feed in the cold waters south of Australia and in the southern Indian Ocean in July - August that make up the Southern Bluefin Tuna fishery. Unfortunately for their chances of survival, SBT are delicious, and fetch a high price as sashimi in Japan. More than 90% of the 15,000 t. of SBT caught each year by Japanese, Australian, New Zealand, Taiwanese, South Korean and Indonesian fishing fleets, and by the large number of vessels operating under "flags of convenience", is imported into Japan.
The dispute between the three countries has both legal and scientific aspects, but the most important is the difference of scientific opinion about the state of SBT stocks. Both sides are agreed that the massive unrestrained catch of SBT by Australia and Japan between the mid-1950s and the mid-1980s devastated stocks to a critical level. The Japanese SBT catch started from zero in 1952, raced to 60,000 t in 1959, and peaked at just under 80,000 t. in 1961. In the following years global catch levels by weight fell quickly, though the number of fish caught by the Australian fishing fleet rapidly increased until the early 1980s.
Informal and voluntary Australian-Japanese cooperation to manage the collapsing SBT stock began in the early 1980s. In 1993, Australia, New Zealand and Japan established the CCSBT, under which the total allowable catch [TAC] remains at 11,750 t., and set agreed quotas for the three countries. Under the voluntary agreements of the 1980s and the CCSBT regime, Japan and Australia accepted very substantial cuts in their respective catch levels, with the Japanese allocation declining by more than half between 1985 and 1990.
The 1993 TAC was set at a level the CCSBT decided was adequate to allow the SBT to return to its 1980 stock level by 2020. Now, according to the Japanese government, SBT stocks are recovering quicker than expected, and consequently, an increased TAC - and an increased quota for Japan - is reasonable. The Australian and New Zealand governments have rejected this claim, arguing that the research studies on which the Japanese government is relying are scientifically inadequate. Japan's decision to commence a unilateral Experimental Fishing Programme in 1998, to continue until 2001 with an annual EFP catch of up to 2000 t., followed three years of failed negotiations within the CCSBT to establish a joint research programme.
Japan has temporarily suspended its EFP as ordered by the ITLOS, but has not abandoned either the EFP or its requests under the CCSBT for a much higher quota in the future. New negotiations ordered by ITLOS have been fruitless, and the dispute is certain to go for final resolution to an Arbitral Tribunal under the UN Law of the Sea in the coming year.
Marine ecology in general is still very under-developed compared to terrestrial ecology, and little is really known of the complex life cycle and requirements of highly migratory large fish such as SBT. Moreover, the scientific differences between Australia and New Zealand on one side, and Japan on the other, are very complex, involving disagreements about ecological modelling techniques, mathematical techniques, assumptions underpinning research design, and the actual execution of the research design. These issues are not going to be easily or quickly resolved, even in an atmosphere of goodwill.
What is clear, and immediately threatening for the future of SBT, is the rapid expansion of SBT fishing in the 1990s by states which are not members of the CCSBT to more than 4,500 t. in 1998. South Korea and Taiwan have expressed some interest in joining the CCSBT, but demand that the TAC be raised to allow them to maintain their existing catches. Taiwan's entry is diplomatically sensitive because of China's "one-China policy", and severe economic recession has made South Korea more anxious than ever to maintain export income. Indonesian entry is even more unlikely, and there has been little global progress about the issue of "flag of convenience" fishing fleets.
While Japan maintains its EFP policy is simply a matter of scientifically establishing a rational basis for judging the appropriate sustainable catch for SBT, Australian officials clearly believe that the Japanese motive is purely economic. The Japanese fishing industry, they point out, has undergone severe rationalization in recent years, with more pressure to come to allow higher levels of fish imports. Japanese aggressiveness to expand its own SBT catch, it is argued, derives from a government commitment to maintain the remaining long-range fishing sector in good health. Coincidentally, this would also benefit the ruling party in Japan.
On the other hand, Australia maintains its action are motivated by principled commitment to ecologically sustainable development. The SBT stock levels are still in an extremely vulnerable condition, Australian scientists argue, and Japanese EFP pressure, plus that of the CCSBT non-member states, could well push SBT stocks towards near-extinction levels. While this is undoubtedly a real possibility, Australian government economic advisers have made another motive abundantly clear. Australian marine exports have climbed dramatically in recent years, as successive Labor and Liberal governments have emphasized the need for increased exports and the need to maintain Australian competitiveness in global export markets. These advisers emphasize the possibility of much larger Australian SBT exports in the future if the stock is allowed to recover sufficiently.
In other words, while the scientists on each side may well be carrying out research to their best ability, and advocating their positions in good faith, the governments are clearly motivated by profits and local economic welfare.
Yet while this government-to-government conflict is becoming more protracted and serious at an official level, much that is extremely important to the future survival of the SBT as an endangered species is being ignored. How should we think about the questions of human responsibility towards nature, working beyond ideas of "national interest", and even beyond the idea of the "human interest" towards justice towards living creatures? What are the implications for the human exploitation of SBT policy in such a framework?
Japan continues to maintain that evidence from its SBT Experimental Fishing Programme shows the SBT stocks are recovering more quickly than expected from the devastation caused by overfishing the last thirty years. Accordingly, an increased total allowable catch [TAC] is justified, and with that, an expanded Japanese SBT quota. Australia and New Zealand maintain that the Japanese evidence is flawed, and that an increased TAC, especially with an increased catch by non-member states of the CCSBT, raises the risk of collapse of the fishery to very high levels.
The three countries have agreed on their choice of arbitrators, and unless last minute negotiations succeed, then the Arbitration Tribunal will take place, resulting in a legally binding judgement on all three parties under the UNLOS. Despite Japan's loss in the first case in the ITLOS last year, MAFF officials believe that Japan's legal and scientific position is strong enough to win. Australian officials are confident their position will win.
Whatever the outcome of the Arbitration Tribunal, the future is bleak for the SBT, for the CCSBT, and for Japan's reputation as a responsible member of the international environmental community.
Japan's misunderstanding of the politics of the dispute
The Japanese government seems to have a serious misunderstanding of at least one aspect of the politics of the affair. Japanese officials I have spoken firmly believe the reason for the strength of the Australian position is the government's fear of the power of environment organizations. In the late 1980s and early 1990s organizations such as the Australian Conservation Foundation, the Wilderness Society, and Greenpeace Australia did have considerable influence over the environmental policy formulation under the Hawke and Keating Labor governments. But with the election of the Liberal Party - National Party coalition in 1993, the influence of environmental NGOs has declined dramatically. Indeed, in the most important 1990s environmental policy debates, such as greenhouse gas emissions, and uranium mining in Kakaku National Park, the Howard government has an appalling record. The conservative coalition has been extremely resistant to policy advice from the main environment groups. And in any case, these NGOs have suffered a general decline in size and strength compared with the 1980s. Amongst the larger Australian environmental NGOs, only Greenpeace Australia has taken up SBT as a campaign issue. Smaller groups with international links such as the Humane Society and TRAFFIC have been active, but overall their influence has been small. The Japanese government in this respect is misinformed when it blames Australian resistance to its SBT plans on the power of Australian environmental groups.
The real sources of the Australian determination to resist Japanese overfishing of SBT would appear to be two-fold: the certainty amongst Australian government scientists that the species is on the brink of commercial extinction; and the determination of the conservative government to protect the species as a base for an ongoing acquaculture export industry in the future.
On this occasion, the Australian government appears to be following the advice of senior government scientists who have long been concerned about rampant overfishing of SBT. Some of these scientists have indicated they would like to recommend a reduction in the size of the TAC. The differences of scientific opinion between Japanese and Australian/New Zealand scientists are serious and increasingly bitter, and the Japanese unilateral SBT Experimental Fishing Programmes in 1998 and 1999 has made matters worse rather than better.
What is interesting, however, is that the Howard government, which has generally had a poor environmental record by Australian standards, has allowed this scientific advice to direct its policy to the point of provoking a major international dispute with a powerful economic partner. The most likely explanation for this determination is that the government fears that overfishing will lead to the collapse of South Australian SBT acquaculture. Tuna farming in the small South Australian town of Port Lincoln began only in 1991, when the local SBT fishing catch had collapsed. Begun as a last throw to save the dying town's economy, local fishing companies, with considerable support from Japan, rapidly developed tuna farming to the point were it is now worth more than A$100m a year in exports to Japan, and employs more than 1,000 people. Almost all of the Australian SBT quota is made up of juvenile fish caught offshore for fattening at Port Lincoln, prior to export to Japan. Moreover, under the Australian government's drive to expand exports, SBT acquaculture exports to the Japanese sashimi market are expected to continue to rise, in competition with wild fishing on the high seas - as long as the SBT stock is maintained at a sustainable level. Hence the willingness to take Japan to court under international law.
How to maximize the risk of fisheries collapse
If we leave to one side the question of which side is actually right on the scientific issues, there is still an important policy question in the face of the high level of uncertainty surrounding the state of SBT stocks. No-one really knows the state of SBT stock or, more importantly, its future. The predictions which are being debate in international court have many uncertainties and risks built into them. This is best understood in the following figure, which sets out the likely outcomes of an SBT catch at a "high level" (understood as considerably higher than the present TAC, as Japan has requested) and at a "low" level (understood as the present TAC or less).
| Optimistic view correct (Japan) |
Pessimistic view correct (Australia/New Zealand) |
|
|---|---|---|
| Low catch | Recovery at a rapid pace | Recovery at a slow pace |
| High catch | Recovery at a slow pace | Fishery collapse, risk of commercial extinction |
This illustrates the politics of the distribution of ecological risk. If Japan's optimistic view is correct, then a low catch (say, the present TAC or less) will allow relatively fast recovery of the stock to 1980 levels by 2020, and a high catch would allow a slower recovery. If the Australian and New Zealand scientists' pessimistic views are correct, a low catch would also allow recovery, at a slow pace. However, if the Australian and New Zealand pessimism is justified, the SBT stock will collapse, and the risk of commercial extinction becomes very real. Little would be lost by Japan abiding by the existing TAC, and allowing the stock to recover - rapidly if its scientists are right, more slowly if not. The alternative is a much greater likelihood of collapse of the fishery. And all for sashimi.
SBT are sold almost entirely on the Japanese sashimi market. The risk of provoking a collapse in the SBT fishery and commercial extinction for the sake of a rich country's luxury food is almost unbelievable. At present, the issue is a relatively small one in international scientific and environmental circles, with little public interest in the issue in Australia and New Zealand. However this silence is unlikely to continue if there are firmer indications that the pessimistic view is correct - as seems very likely.
The optimistic view is based virtually exclusively on data from Japanese fishing industry sources (records from fishing boats) rather than independent scientific observation. Australia's lawyers at the ITLOS tribunal pointed to the lesson of the northern (Atlantic) cod fishery off Canada, which collapsed in 1991, costing the Canadian government more than $US3 billion in re-establishment costs and social, security expenses. All of the many official assessments of the northern cod prior to 1991 relied on fishing industry sources, and all spectacularly failed to predict the crisis. Australia and New Zealand have been pressing for more independent and scientifically valid research, since only such independent scientific research gave any hint of the imminent northern cod collapse prior to 1991.
Small mercies
There has been some progress within the CCSBT. Japan will introduce a system of certification to indicate the country of origin of SBT imports into Japan. This will immediately identify imports from flag of convenience [FOC] vessels operating outside the CCSBT, and should lead to restrictions of such imports. Indeed in December 1999, following criticism from Greenpeace and TRAFFIC Japan, and anticipating the introduction of the certification scheme, the largest Japanese SBT importer Mitsubishi Trading Company, announced that it would cease purchases from FOC sources. This still leaves the serious problem of high and rising level of imports from CCSBT non-member countries - Taiwan, South Korea and Indonesia.
The path forward: CITES nomination
The key, however, is Japan. At the moment, Japanese SBT fishing is effectively unrestrained, since Japan has twice raised its catch levels, up to 40% of its mid-1990s quota under the CCSBT. The CCSBT itself is all but dead as a means of regulating the SBT fishery. The findings of the upcoming Arbitration Tribunal are legally binding on all parties - meaning Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Hopefully, the Tribunal will order Japan to abandon its unilateral EFP. Even so, the CCSBT works by consensus, and is therefore likely to remain stalemated, and useless. Japan has suggested transferring responsibility for management of SBT to the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission [IOTC], but Australia and New Zealand have rejected this on the understandable ground that the IOTC is well known to be toothless. Although they do not say so, the fact that he majority of IOTC member countries are relatively poor and susceptible to Japanese financial influence would weigh on their minds.
With continuing unregulated fishing by Taiwan, Korea and Indonesia, and with the possibility of Japan leaving the CCSBT altogether, one of the few remaining options for protecting the SBT would be nomination of the species under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna [CITES]. Listing under Appendix 2 of CITES would bind all countries to arrangements which set trade at sustainable levels. This would necessarily include Taiwan, Korea and Indonesia, as well as Japan and Australia and New Zealand.
In the past, the Australian government has rejected the CITES route, arguing that the CCSBT is more effective. Yet if the moribund CCSBT collapses completely, there will be a rapid increase in political pressure on the Australian government to consider nominating SBT under Appendix 2 of CITES. No doubt Japan would respond fiercely as it did when Sweden nominated the very vulnerable Northern Bluefin Tuna [NBT] [Thunnus thynnus] in 1991, following decades of mismanagement by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas [ICCAT]. At this point the Japanese government's fear of pressure from international environmental NGOs would be justified, since there would be an very substantial public response, beginning in Australia and New Zealand, but spreading rapidly. Japan would be left in isolation, defending the indefensible - the right to drive a species to the brink of extinction, in order to eat unlimited amounts of tuna sashimi.
From the point of view of responsibility towards nature, the Australian position is, on this occasion at least, admirable, and the Japanese position reprehensible. But the situation demands further action to protect the surviving SBT stocks. Professor J.R. Beddington, an eminent British fisheries scientists was called as an independent expert witness by the Australian and New Zealand side at the ITLOS Tribunal last year. In his evidence Beddington said that leaving aside the areas of disagreement between Japanese and Australian and New Zealand scientists, on the basis of the evidence about which they did agree, he would recommend a reduction in catches of SBT. Indeed the implication of much of Australian and New Zealand scientific analyses would support such a demand, especially in the face of an expanded SBT catch by Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia.
The nomination of a species under CITES can only be done by the government of a nation-state. This requires either a high level of disinterested responsibility towards nature, usually going together with a lack of direct economic involvement with exploitation of the species concerned [as with Sweden and the NBT in 1991], or a judgement that a country's capacity to exploit a species in the long-term is best protected by strong global regulation.
Global authority, responsibility to nature, and democracy
The postwar period has been marked by a rolling back of the principle of the "freedom of the high seas", which has led to a profound decline and restructuring of the Japanese fishing industry. Voluntary species management arrangements such as the CCSBT are an intermediate and inadequate step towards comprehensive global management of all commercially exploitable species. CITES nomination for SBT is the next logical step. However, the fact that CITES, like the IMF, the WTO and the World bank and so many other institutions of global governance is a body made up only of nation-states places serious limits on their capacity to exercise democratic responsibility. What is needed are procedures whereby it is possible for civil society groups - such as international environmental protection organizations - can make appropriate nominations, and participate in an appropriate manner in decision-making. Here issues of responsibility towards nature and issues of democracy come together - since there are many occasions on which a system of governments by nation-states fails on both grounds.