Lessons from Oslo, Jerusalem and Belfast:
Notes on the Paths to Self-determination in East Timor

Richard Tanter

International Conference on East Timor:
History and Conflict Resolution.
Kansai Instate of Asia-Pacific Studies, Osaka University of Foreign Studies
and
the University of Aveiro (Portugal)
December 5-6, 1998

Draft only: not for quotation

Let me briefly discuss a number of issues that are likely to cause difficulty in the process to self-government, and in the wider self-determination process. At the risk of appearing to be provocative I want to refer to two other contemporary "peace processes" - Palestine and Northern Ireland. The Palestinian catastrophe should give all of us cause to reflect on how the path to peace is going to be effected in East Timor .

Approving Self-determination processes

In November 1993, the CNRM peace plan [1] outlined a three phase process to bring peace and self-determination. In subsequent statements, Xanana and Ramos-Horta have indicated their willingness to be flexible over matters of detail, and have sometimes introduced new elements. However the basic proposal has not varied, and has focussed on providing a feasible plan that Indonesia could conceivably accept, once it gives up its longing for colonial domination.

One issue I want to raise is the question of how any agreement is to be approved on the East Timorese side. The key question here is this: should broadly based should be the process of approval of a proposal for self-determination that issues from UN-sponsored negotiations between Indonesia, Portugal and CNRM? The question of a referendum as the end-point for self-determination is a fundamental goal, and its is generally understood that a transition or preparation period is necessary. But the terms of the agreement on autonomy and such a referendum will be absolutely crucial. Is it likely that there could be any serious disagreement amongst pro-self-determination East Timorese over such terms?

I have no real idea, but the Palestine example should teach us to be wary. Almost as soon as the Oslo accord was announced there were three important types of Palestinian criticisms were voiced. Firstly, it was argued from the start that Arafat had given away far too much to the Israelis, and that the Palestinian Authority would be either be powerless or a creature of the Israeli government. Secondly, it was argued that Arafat had not paid due heed to the political leadership in the West Bank and Gaza, and that he had no sense of the concrete realities in occupied Palestine - after all, he had not set foot in the country for two decades. The Palestinian Authority leadership was largely made up of the old PLO leadership which had spent, it was argued too long in exile. And thirdly, it was argued that the interests of Palestinians in the diaspora, including nearby refugees in Middle Eastern countries, were completely ignored in favour of very small and easily reversible gains on limited portions of the West Bank and Gaza.

History has shown how appallingly prescient and accurate each of these three criticisms was. Arafat and the Palestinian Authority are largely discredited amongst Palestinians as corrupt and tyrannical bureaucrats who consider only their own interests, and Palestinians at left with even less power and fewer options than before Oslo.

The point here is not talk about the rights and wrongs of Palestine and its negotiations. However this example should remind us that the way agreements are negotiated is extremely important. CNRM is very different from the old PLO, and Xanana is no Arafat. The charter of rights and responsibilities of the future independent East Timor drawn up by CNRM in Peniche this year [2] displays an extremely impressive commitment to building an East Tumor that will be a model of social democratic constitutional democracy.

However, there are important questions of process to consider. There is a Timorese diaspora. There are differences of opinion within CNRT and beyond. Sometimes these are matters of degree, sometimes more substantial. CNRT has worked extremely hard in recent years to build a structure that combines a capacity for effective decision-making with a respect for and acknowledgement of the diversity within the pro-self-determination forces in the East Timorese communities around the world. CNRT under the leadership of Xanana Gusmao, and the National Political Commission headed by Jose Ramos-Horta, Joao Carrascalao and others has devoted considerable efforts to reconciling differences of opinion and lingering antipathies from earlier days [3]. Equally CNRT has consolidated a complex two-way flow of both information and decision-making structures spanning from Cipinang Prison in Jakarta to East Timor and beyond to the CNRT external leadership and the ever-increasing numbers of impressive activists and intellectuals emerging from East Timorese diaspora communities around the world.

However, there are important questions of process to consider. There is a Timorese diaspora. There are differences of opinion within CNRT and beyond. Sometimes these are matters of degree, sometimes more substantial. It is not really possible to predict sensibly. The only sensible comment is to say that conflict of objectives should always be expected, and that it would be wise if CNRT's admirable democratic objectives as expressed in the 1998 Magna Carta were reflected from the earliest stages of the consideration of a proposed agreement.

Here the 1998 Northern Ireland process seems helpful. A core part of the Blair-Ahern sponsored agreement between the pro-nationalist and pro-integrationist parties in Northern Ireland was that the subsequent complex transition agreement would itself be immediately put to a referendum in both Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. More importantly, the proposed agreement written in plain and understandable language was distributed to every household on the island. Both governments campaigned heavily for a month to generate a "Yes" vote, as did the IRA's de facto political wing Sinn Fein, together with almost all major political parties. No one could have said they were not consulted about the agreement.

For anything like this to occur, Indonesia will have to agree to the free access of all East Timorese to East Timor, and guarantees of freedom of speech. Of course, when it comes time to consider a referendum on self-determination as such, nothing less could be expected. However, perhaps it should also be considered at a much earlier stage.

State structures and "self-government"

Interesting and complex plans have been produced by both CNRT and some of its supporters about institutions of government appropriate for different stages of the move towards self-determination. The Magna Carta Declaration shows that Ramos-Horta's long-held hope that a free East Timor will be "a model of democracy and human rights" is shared by the CNRT leadership. However, there are a large number of extremely difficult issues lying here.

The first, of course, is the question of deliberative structures - councils, parliaments, or whatever. Clearly the old Indonesian regional assembly and its structures will not do, even in the shortest transition. Without assessing the proposed models for assemblies, it is important just once more to bear in mind the negative lesson of the Palestinian Authority [PA], the executive body headed by Yasir Arafat. In a short time the PA has come to disregard the authority of the legislative branch of the state.

A second question is the structure of administration. Unfortunately, East Timor's historical legacy in this area is a remarkably bureaucratic one: the combined effects of Portuguese and Indonesian colonial bureaucracies. Here perhaps it will be important to remember some of the successes of the brief period of FRETILIN administration which were marked by a willingness to invent new structures based on a closeness to the people.

A third question about the self-governing state concerns the role of courts, especially in their role in defending the rights of individuals against the executive government. Malaysia obviously comes to mind here. Or indeed, Japan. But again, closer to our problem, the Palestinian experience has been extremely bitter, with judges critical of the procedures of the Palestinian authority either forcibly retired or their decisions simply ignored. The task for a self-governing Timor Leste will be to find a way to make the ideals of the Magna Carta concrete, so that first and foremost, citizens feel secure and confident in their everyday lives. I will return to some more complex questions of law later, but let us just recall that East Timor, self-governing and/or independent, will be a small country, and for some time, it will continue to be a poor country. Building an effective legal system in such circumstances is difficult, but all the more important.

Issues of policing and demilitarization

Xanana Gusmao and his colleagues have shown great sensitivity to some important questions about how security in the territory is to be secured and maintained. Apart from the ordinary concerns citizens may have with security, a self-governing East Timor will face three extra problems, each of which is capable of being exploited by opponents of self-determination. These are the issues of armed rebellion, revenge, and the inability to demilitarize after two and a half decades of war. CNRT has shown it is very alert to the political dangers these issues pose, but let me outline each and comment briefly.

Firstly, Indonesian and other opponents of self-determination argue that just as CNRT has fought to resist integration with Indonesia, then it is possible that those favouring integration may be forced to take the same path. This, they argue, constitutes an ongoing danger of regional destabilization for Indonesia.

Secondly, it is inevitable that after all the suffering flowing from war and occupation that many East Timorese will feel extreme bitterness towards Indonesians in the territory, and more importantly, towards East Timorese they regard, with lesser or greater justice, as collaborators. It is well to remember how fierce such feelings can be. After the end of World War 2 in Europe, some 40,000 French citizens held to be collaborators with the Nazi occupation (which was only four years in duration, compared to 23) were summarily executed by French resistance forces. One can well imagine the fears of some East Timorese faced with the prospect of Indonesian withdrawal. Equally, it is entirely reasonable that Indonesia be concerned with guarantees of protection for its citizens during the transitional process.

Thirdly, two decades of war have had a profound psychological and social effect on East Timor. Will it be possible for the habits of violence and secrecy, necessary for survival under alien occupation, to be forgotten? Will it be possible for FALANTIL fighters to make the transition to the demilitarized East Timor that CNRT has envisaged? In Palestine, the solution of transferring former PLO fighters to the police force of the Palestinian Authority has largely been unsuccessful, and police violation of human rights is held to be part of the reason for antagonism towards the Palestinian Authority.

CNRT has clearly begun to think through these problems. CNRT's peace plans now stress the importance of demilitarization, the disbanding of domestic military forces, and the role of the United Nations in maintaining peace in the transition period. There are some difficulties with each of these, however. The United Nations will be wary of committing large numbers of armed peace-keeping troops in Timor: will limited numbers of UN observers, with a limited brief of reporting violations of agreements, such as in south Lebanon, be sufficient? The CNRT plan is sensible, but what can be expected of the UN over the three to seven years a transition may take?

Xanana Gusmao and Jose Ramos-Horta have stressed the need to eschew revenge, to build a society based on compassion. The first step is to forget the simple-minded notion of "collaborator" all together. In 23 years of Indonesian occupation, the families of even the most ardent supporter of independence will have had to make any number of accommodations, some compromises with Indonesian authority, just to survive. Lives are not always lived politically. CNRT will have to move rapidly once Indonesian authority begins to crumble.

Equally, CNRT has indicated some understanding of the position of innocent Indonesian citizens in East Timor. Indonesia is sure to demand guarantees of protection for its citizens. However their numbers are now so large that there will have to be complex plans made to actually manage the process of withdrawal of Indonesian troops from the mountains and countryside to the towns, and from there to Indonesia itself. Much can go wrong. Here again, the question of how large a UN presence can be expected is important.

CNRT has a proud claim that no civilian supporter of Indonesian rule has been intentionally killed. Yet the trauma of victims of violence knows no party, no nationality. At the level of policy, CNRT has indicated it will aim for a demilitarized East Timor without an army. Yet there are again practical problems to consider: in Northern Ireland, despite the general agreement of the IRA and Sinn Fein to support and abide by the Blair-Ahern agreement, the IRA has refused to surrender its weapons, and other nationalist and integrationist groups likewise. At what point will the weapons be collected?

The ideal of an East Timor without an army is to be greatly commended: what is the point of an army in any case? Indonesia, once it withdraws, will never invade again. But it may use violent forms of intimidation to achieve its political objectives at some time in the future. A militarized police force could turn out to be little different from an army, especially if, as at least one set of foreign advisers have suggested, there is also an independent intelligence service [4]. The mildest response one could give to this suggestion is that it needs rather more thought about issues of control and oversight.

Language

A key question that will affect the success of self-government is language, and its connection to identity. There are at least three widely spoken languages today - Portuguese, Tetum, and Indonesian. The Magna Carta stresses the country's "Judeo-Christian" identity. Portuguese, its says, will be the official language of an independent East Timor. Does this reflect completely the document's commitment to protection of cultural pluralism and diversity? More importantly, it may turn out to be the case that this becomes a mark of division. The Portuguese-speaking origins of cultural identity may be quite solid, but it may also be the case that two decades of education in Indonesian language have changed the medium through which that identity is articulated. This could become extremely difficult and divisive in education, administration, and general cultural policy. If we note that for many young people in the diaspora, especially in Australia, English is close to being a first language for a majority, then the difficulties and sensitivities become even sharper. This takes us back to my original point about relations between in the diaspora and those who have lived under Indonesian rule for 23 years.

Law and economics

I have already indicated some problems in the area of law, especially in relation to the independence of judges. Let me briefly raise some further difficulties about law. The first question is: "what law"? From the very first day of any level of self-government in East Timor, the clash of legal systems will be heard [5]. Are contracts and titles that were written freely under Indonesian law, where there was no coercion involved, to be considered valid? Where Indonesian law and colonial Portuguese law differed significantly, which approach is to be followed? If Indonesian law is to be followed as an interim step, then for how long where there are significant tensions arising?

More urgently still, what is the status of property and other contracts dating from the Indonesian occupation period where some element of coercion is demonstrable, even if the coercion was not exercised by the present beneficiaries? One approach is simply to say that the pre-invasion situation should be restored. But in all but the simplest and most blatant cases of theft, this may rapidly come to be a moral and practical quagmire.

On a larger scale, the legal status of the Australia-Indonesian Timor Sea Zone of Cooperation for the joint exploitation of oil production. In July this year, oil actually began to flow from the Elang Kakatua field, though in fairly small volumes.

The start of oil production by joint venture partners BHP, Santos, Petroz and Inpex Sahul from the Elang Kakatua field in what is called the 'Zone of Cooperation', means that, under the fiscal terms of the Timor Gap Treaty (TGT) between Australia and Indonesia, a share of revenue will flow to Jakarta.

Elang Kakatua is a relatively small oil field containing some 30 million barrels of oil, yielding some 600 million US dollars in revenue over four to five years. Royalties and tax revenues to the Indonesian Government would be some 130 million US dollars [6].

To the dismay of the Indonesian government Xanana Gusmao met with a representative of the huge Australian mining company BHP in his Jakarta prison cell. More distressing still for Indonesia was Xanana's assurance to the oil executive

"that BHP and other mining companies should not worry about the policies of the Timorese resistance".

Xanana said:

"We encourage them to stay on, looking to help the Timorese with the proceeds from the oil until a resolution is reached'. [7]

I think we can be fairly sure that the Australian government will not stand in the way of a company like BHP on this matter. In time the serious legal and revenue sharing issues will have to be addressed, but this is a fairly straightforward matter, once the Australian and Indonesian governments concede, at least de facto, the illegality of their actions in signing the Timor Gap Treaty.

Conclusion

There are any number of important issues that I have not touched on in this talk. For myself, I do not feel this is a problem. It will be done by others. One of the most encouraging aspects of the present situation is the impressive work that is being done by East Timorese intellectuals in the diaspora such as Joao Mariano Saldanha and Helder da Costa. I also have a sense of the sophistication and complexity of thinking of intellectuals concerned with justice and social development working under difficult conditions inside East Timor itself. Taken together with the work by CNRT [8] and its foreign supporters, these promise to provide a tremendous resource for the day when self-government, and then, self-determination comes.

Why then should we concern ourselves with these questions, as I have today in a patchy and somewhat amateurish way?

What matters is that these issues are at least begun to be talked about, by as many people who really care about East Timor as possible. I think that we all should be trying to talk about these issues, from our different positions as East Timorese, as Indonesians, as Japanese, as activists, as sociologists, as post office workers, or whatever. Our perspectives may be different, and our levels and types of responsibility may differ, but we all have some responsibility to try to contribute to the ferment of ideas that will shape East Timor. This is a responsibility which cannot be avoided.

I do not pretend to know the best way forward for East Timor in concrete terms. But I want to argue very strongly for the maximum level of discussion of important issues that affect everyday life, the maximum freedom to express feelings and hopes in relation to everyday life. A crucial aspect of the path to self-determination is the creation of a ferment of ideas, the encouragement of the belief that everyone has something of importance to say in creating the future.

Politics is always a matter of inventing the future on the run. There is no perfect plan. I feel very strongly that in politics truth and good emerges from a situation of maximum practical democracy, where all people in a community feel free to speak, and do so. The community of East Timor, for these purposes, extends far beyond the small and beautiful island and its extraordinarily courageous people.